RECENT CASES
AGRICULTURE-SEcTION

8c(5) (G)

OF THE AGRICULTURAL

MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT PROHIBITS FEDERAL MM'K MARKET-

ING ORDERS FiROm REQUIRING COMPENSATORY

PAYMENTS

THAT

CONSTITUTE TRADE BARRIERs

Petitioners, Pennsylvania dairies and milk handlers, sold fluid milk
in the New York-New Jersey marketing area. The area marketing orderpart of a federal regulatory scheme aimed at preventing ruinous competition in over-supplied markets-required milk handlers who sold fluid milk
from outside the area to pay the difference between the area fluid and
surplus milk prices 1 into a fund to compensate area milk producers whose
milk was displaced from the profitable fluid milk market. Petitioners'
challenge to this compensatory payment scheme was rejected by the Third
Circuit which reversed the district court. 2 The Supreme Court, however,
Mr. Justice Black dissenting, found that the compensatory paymdnts constituted an economic trade barrier, inconsistent with section 8c(5) (G) of.
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. a Lehigh Valley Co-op.
Farmers,Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 6 (1962).
Section 8c(5) (G) provides:
No marketing agreement or order applicable to milk and its
products in any marketing area shall prohibit or in any manner
limit, in the case of the products of milk, the marketing in that
area of any milk or product thereof produced in any production
area in the United States.
The Eighth Circuit, in Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. A-nderson,4 held that the
word "limit" applied only to "the products of milk" so that orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture could limit but not absolutely prohibit the mar1 See 7 C.F.R. § 1002 (1962) for the entire marketing order for the New YorkNew Jersey milk marketing area. The amount of payment was computed as the

difference between the fluid milk price and the surplus milk price-the amount of
money that the outside handler would divert from the marketing area. The Secretary

of Agriculture ruled that, since the outside handlers would not enter the marketing

area unless they had surplus milk to sell, they should not receive more than the value
of the milk as surplus milk.
2 United

States v. Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers, Inc., 287 F2d 726 (3d Cir.

1961), reversing 183 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1960), but afirming Suncrest Farms, Inc.,

18 Agri. Dec. 191 (1959), and Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers, 18 Agri. Dec. 75
(1959).
350 Stat. 246 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §608c(5) (1958).
4 157 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 788 (1946). Although the marketing order was very dissimilar to that in the instant case, the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of § 8c(5) (G) is irreconcilable with the present majority's construction.
(497)
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keting of milk itself. In1H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,5 a majority of
the Supreme Court expressly left the question open, 6 while Justices Black
and 'Murphy, dissenting, approved the Bailey interpretation. 7 The Department of Agriculture has consistently followed the Bailey interpretation and has repeatedly dismissed petitions in which producers and handlers
have contended that marketing orders were inconsistent with section

8c(5) (G).
The Court, not obliged to defer to the interpretation of section Sc (5)
(G) adopted by the Department of Agriculture,9 independently interpreted
the statute, drawing heavily on legislative history. The majority found
that Congress intended not only to prohibit all absolute physical restrictions
on the marketing of milk but also to prohibit all economic barriers to trade
except those specifically allowed by other clauses of section 8c.1 0 The
dissent, however, objecting that the majority's construction did violence to
the deliberately chosen language of section Sc (5) (G), followed the Bailey
interpretation and said that the word "prohibit" applied only to "blanket
prohibitions," not to a trade barrier."
The legislative history of Sc(5) (G) shows that Congress intended
milk marketing to remain competitive. Originally, the proposed act contained no equivalent of the section, but four midwestern Congressmen 12
insisted on such a provision and pressed for a prohibition of any orders
that would limit or even tend to limit the marketing of milk in any area of
the country; 1 3 they agreed to the present provision only after repeated
5 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
6 Id. at 543-44. Since this case involved state rather than federal regulation,
the Court did not have to interpret the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The
Court's treatment of this point may have indicated a disapproval of Bailey, because
the Court stated that the purpose of the act was to stimulate interstate commerce.
See note 7 infra. Id. at 544-45.
7 "Congress has even given him [the Secretary of Agriculture] power to limit
milk shipments as between different federal marketing areas." H. P. Hood & Sons
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 561 (1949) (dissenting opinion). The majority in dictum
disagreed as to the powers of the Secretary under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.
Section 8c(5) (G) was also mentioned by Judge Learned Hand, dissenting, in
Kass v. Brannan, 196 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 891 (1952), in which
he agreed with the Bailey interpretation. However, the majority did not reach the
limitation issue; it decided that a federal milk marketing order was invalid because
it led to a discriminatory classification of milk, outlawed by § 8c(5) (A).
8 E.g., Grocer's Dairy Co., 18 Agri. Dec. 995 (1959); Chapman, 18 Agri. Dec.

323 (1959); Suncrest Farms, Inc., 18 Agri. Dec. 191 (1959); Lawson Milk Co.,
17 Agri. Dec. 239 (1958). In Chapman, supra at 336, the judicial officer cited Bailey
and held that § 8c(5) (G) "precludes only a prohibition in a marketing order against
the entry of milk into a marketing area."
9 Cf. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156 (1944); 4 DAVs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 30.09, at 242 (1958).
10 Instant case at 97-99. See generally Hutt, Restrictions on the Free Movement
of Fluid Milk under Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 37 U. DET. L.J. 525, 530-41
(1960).
11 Instant case at 104-09.
12 Representative Andresen of Minnesota and Representatives Sauthoff, Boileau,
and Hull of Wisconsin. See 79 CONG. REc. 9462, 9572 (1935).
13 Id. at 9572 (r..'marks of Representative Sauthoff).
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assurances from the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture 14
that the Secretary could not limit importation except in the manner provided in the statute. 15 8c(5) (G) was authored, 16 amended, argued for,
and thoroughly approved by Congressmen whose interests, which were in
accord with those of the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture,
demanded free movement of milk in interstate commerce, unhampered by
trade barriers; the purpose of the section was thus to effect a competitive
17
rather than a protective marketing system.
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the Court's use of a specific section8c(5) (G)-to inhibit a general grant of power '8 does not frustrate the
congressional design to aid milk producers, for section 1 states that the act
aims to avoid conditions, such as trade barriers, that burden or obstruct
interstate commerce. 19 In H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, ° the Court
said that the deliberate policy of Congress was to prevent federal officers
from placing barriers in the way of the interstate flow of milk.21 Milk
exportation is important to the economies of several midwestern states,
and allowance of trade barriers would protect local producers at the
14 Representative Jones of Texas.
15 Mr. ANDRESEN. Is there anything in the milk section of the bill which
gives the Secretary authority to set up trade barriers and stop the free flow
in commerce throughout the United States of dairy products?
Mr. JONES. No. There is nothing in the bill that would authorize
that. . . . [Except for sanitary regulations], he cannot set up any trade
barriers which would keep them out.
Id. at 9462.
Mr. BoiLE.Au. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the distinguished
chairman of the committee if in his opinion there is anything in this bill that
gives to the Secretary of Agriculture or to anyone else any power to restrict
the free flow of milk or any other commodity between the various States?
Mr. JONES. No; there is nothing in it that will do that. The only
tendency is to make all sections comply with the same rules.
Id. at 9572.
16 The author of section 8c(5) (G) was Representative Andresen of Minnesota.
See HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Dairy Products of the House Committee
on Agriculture, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. M, pt. 1, at 73 (1955), in which Representative Andresen stated that the congressional intent of 8c(5) (G) had been disregarded.
17 According to a 1941 interpretation of the act, restrictions on the entry of new
producers and handlers can be accomplished only through cooperatives or by refusal
of the health authorities to qualify milk for sale. The Secretary's orders may not
make restrictions that would obstruct the free movement of milk. U.S. BuREAu OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EcONOMIC STANDARDS

OF GOVERNMENT

PRICE

CONTROL 79 (TNEC Monograph No. 32, 1941).
18 Section 8c(7) (D) of the act authorizes the Secretary to issue orders "incidental to, and not inconsistent with, the terms and conditions specified . . . and
necessary to effectuate" the price-fixing and other powers specifically given to him.
19
It is declared that the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities
in interstate commerce impairs the purchasing power of farmers and destroys
the value of agricultural assets which support the national credit structure and
that these conditions affect transactions in agricultural commodities with a
national public interest, and burden and obstruct the normal channels of
interstate commerce.
50 Stat. 246 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1958).
20 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
211d. at 544-45.
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therefore, the Court's

decision effectuated the congressional policy to stimulate interstate commerce in milk.
The Court did not define "trade barrier," but implied that the order
was illegal because the measure of the "compensatory" payments-the
difference between the fluid and surplus milk prices-was arbitrary and
unrealistic. Petitioner in the instant case paid a higher price for his milk
than local handlers, yet he had to pay an additional $2.78 per hundredweight
as a compensatory payment upon importation of the milk. His total cost,
exclusive of transportation, was 47 percent higher than that of local
handlers. The Court held that this disparity indicated that the measure
does not further the legitimate end of competitive parity among producers
and handlers, but forces imported milk to subsidize area milk, making the
cost of importation prohibitive. The Court did state, however, that compensatory payment provisions per se are not necessarily trade barriers.
An order may legitimately require the importing handler to pay an amount
equal to the difference between his total cost exclusive of transportation
expenses and the total cost to the local handler, thus requiring an outside
handler to forfeit any cost advantage he may have. Although such a provision may still discourage the free flow of milk in commerce, especially if
transportation costs are high,2 it would not establish an unreasonable
differential to bar importation. Thus, "trade barrier" is best defined as a
charge that arbitrarily places an "undue hardship" on the importing handler
and does not assure competitive parity among producers and handlers of
different marketing areas.
The Court did not consider the possible effects of its holding on the
government's agricultural programs, but its decision probably foreshadows
22 Barriers to market entry prevent exporting producers from receiving prices
comparable to those received by local producers because the compensatory payments
force the imported milk into the lower priced classifications.

See 7 C.F.R. § 1002.83 (b)

(1962).
In Minnesota, for example, 75% of the total dairy production must be exported,
and the 1960 average price for Minnesota milk marketed in all forms was $3.07 per cwt.
against the national average of $4.17. Brief for State of Minnesota as Amicus
Curiae, p. 3. This disparity indicates that the milk marketing orders as promulgated
under the act discriminate against exporting states and force their milk to be sold
for use as surplus rather than as fluid milk.
23 The Court said that competitive parity among handlers could be attained without imposing trade barriers. It specified two types of compensatory payment plans
that might not violate 8c(5) (G) by imposing "trade barriers": first, payments
equalling the difference between the fluid milk price in the marketing area and the
actual cost of the outside milk; and second, payments to equal the difference between
the area's fluid milk and producer prices. See instant case at 86-87. Such orders,
however, could restrict the free flow of milk, as in the following example: A Wisconsin handler pays $5.00 per cwt. for his milk and brings it into New York, where
the fluid milk price is $6.00; under the first plan he would be required to pay a compensatory payment of $1.00 per cwt., which would make his cost $6.00 per cwt. But
his transportation expense of $1.00 per cwt. raises his total cost to $7.00 per cwt.,
and the compensatory payment of $1.00 per cwt. has made it economically unfeasible
for him to ship milk into the New York area. Because it ignores transportation
costs, the proposed plan imposes what could be described as a trade barrier, but such
a payment scheme probably would not be prohibited by the holding in the instant case.
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the invalidation of many federal milk marketing orders.24 Since the Secretary had indicated that the compensatory payments in the present case
were the only ones practicable for the New York area 25 and perhaps for
other areas as well, he will now have to abandon his present policies,
especially if the Court's holding is interpreted to forbid the formulation of
area marketing orders designed to prevent the underselling of local by
outside milk.2 6 The regulation of milk marketing is extremely complex;
since the Secretary rather than the Court is competent to.establish marketing regulations, the Court did not suggest guidelines for future orders.2 7
However, the Secretary will be cognizant of his lack of authority to issue
milk marketing orders that unduly burden interstate shipments of fluid milk.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SECOND Cimourr REFuss To Limar
POLmE IxVESTIGATIONS or PERSONS ACCUSED OF CBimE
While defendant was free on bail after indictment for violation of the
federal narcotics law, a confederate allowed a federal officer to place a
listening device in his car and there engaged defendant in a discussion
of the crime. The officer monitored the unguarded admissions made
during the conversation, and testified at the later trial. Defendant claimed
that since he was already under indictment at the time and was represented by counsel, it was a denial of his rights for a federal officer to procure
his statements in the absence of counsel. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, one judge dissenting,1 concluded that since there was no
element of coercion the overheard conversation was admissible in evidence.
United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962).
24

The Secretary has promulgated twenty-two orders stbstantially identical to
the one involved here. Instant case at 83. As of April 1, 1955, 87% of producer
deliveries in the United States went into marketwide pools or pools generally similar
to that in the instant case. HARRIS, CLASSIFIED PRICING CF MILx 25 (U.S. Dep't
of Agriculture Tech. Bull. No. 1184, April 1958).
25 18 Fed. Reg. 8446-51 (1953).
26 See HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 24, at 33.
27
The Court left the question of retrospective application of future orders undecided, to be determined by the district court. On remand, since the government
failed to show that the district court had authority to withhold the amount of the
payments and await the formulation of future provisions by the Secretary, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Clary, J., dismissed the action
and awarded the petitioners the full amount paid into the fund. Civil Nos. 23268,
26048, 26109, E.D. Pa., Aug. 29, 1962. But see United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S.
183, 196-98 (1939).
'The dissenting judge was influenced by the liberal rule adopted by the Court
of Appeals of New York, in construing the right to counsel provision of the New
York Constitution, that no statement made by an accused to a police officer after
indictment in the absence of counsel can be used as evidence. People v. Waterman,
9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). Recently the New York
court went further and held that a voluntary, unsolicited statement made by a defendant to a police officer after preliminary hearing and before indictment is not
admissible in evidence against him. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.F_.2d
103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
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The Supreme Court does not regard police questioning as inherently
2
coercive, and recognizes its social utility in effective law enforcement.
The Court has adhered to the principle that in considering the validity of
a confession or admission 3 resulting from an interrogation it will attempt
to ascertain whether the statement was made voluntarily.4 A statement
is not inadmissible simply because it was not volunteered without questioning,5 or because its maker was in custody,6 or under indictment, 7 or
without counsel 8 at the time.
Recently several Supreme Court Justices have spoken of a possible
right to counsel at secret police interrogations 9 because the atmosphere
created by interrogation in a room under police control readily lends itself
2 See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184-85 (1953).
3 Admissions and confessions are generally treated similarly.
See Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91 (1954).
Nevertheless, on a practical level, courts
may be less willing to find coercion when admissions are made than when confessions
are obtained.
4 See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 (1961) ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 211 (1960); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
Coercive
methods include physical abuse, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
intensive and prolonged interrogation, see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940),
generally oppressive situations indicating strong likelihood the admission was not
freely made, see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.),
methods designed to overbear the defendant, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
The traditional explanation for excluding involuntary confessions is that statements made under these conditions are untrustworthy as evidence, see Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
This is no longer the sole test, however, since coerced confessions are also said to
undermine the tenets of an accusatorial system. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961) ; Lisenba v. California, supra at 236; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
325-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; Watts v. Indiana, supra at 55 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). The reasons for excluding involuntary confessions and for the
privilege from self-incrimination shade into one another, see Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 583 n.25 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ; 8 WIGM ORE, op. Cit. supra
§ 2286, but, having separate historical developments, are not coterminous. Thus,
whereas a person cannot be questioned at his own trial without his consent, see Wood
v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, Z68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; United States ex reL. Reek
v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1960), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), the
Court has not extended the same protection to investigative hearings wherein legal
process can be served, see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), much less to police
investigations. Rather, the Court decides if the method of interrogation is consistent
with due process and the accusatorial system. See Lisenba v. California, supra at
236; Watts v. Indiana, supra at 54 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Even if a statement is voluntary, the Court will exclude, at least in federal trials,
confessions that were gained through violation by investigative officers of other protected rights. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (use of
spike-mike an unlawful search and seizure) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943) (violation of a congressional statute). See generally The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 158-60 (1961).
5 See Lisenba v. California, supra note 4, at 239; Watts v. Indiana, supra note 4,
at 53 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 39 (1951); United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69 (1944).
7 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959)
(dictum).
8 See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958).
9 See, e.g., Cicenia v. Lagay, supra note 8, at 508-09; Crooker v. California,
supra note 8, at 439 n.4.
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to coercion. 10 Emphasizing the directness of his contact with the investigating officer, through the agency of the confederate, defendant in the
instant case attempted to place himself within the scope of these remarks
*and to categorize the occurrence as an "interrogation." " Significantly,
however, the Justices who have most strongly criticized secret questioning
have stressed that the presence of counsel is desirable to prevent coercive
third degree methods, 12 rather than to guard against voluntary admissions.
Since the fact of indictment can in no way change the voluntariness of admissions, the "interrogation" in the present case did not present the dangers
that would require the presence of counsel to protect the rights of the
accused.' 3 Thus, the extension of the right to counsel to situations in
which the atmosphere surrounding the questioning is not likely to foster
coercion and in which the defendant is neither overborne nor forced to
make admissions would needlessly handicap police investigation without
compensating gain.
If the activity of the officers violated any right in the instant case it
was not specifically the right to presence of counsel, but a broader right
to prepare for trial without hindrance. The courts have traditionally
valued defendants' right to prepare for trial as a necessary part of the
adversary system, and have imposed safeguards to insure that one method
of preparation, the assistance of counsel, remains more than a formality.
Counsel must have sufficient time to prepare the defense 14 unhampered by
other judicially imposed duties.' 5 The accused has a right to private
10A leading text on police investigations describes an 'atmosphere that understandably concerns the Court:
The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his
own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly
aware of his rights. . . . In his own office, the investigator possesses all
the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of law.
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 99 (1961).
See also Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330, 353 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
11 The definition proposed was similar to that recently offered in another federal
case-an interrogation is any prodding or triggering statement by one who is an
agent of the prosecuting authorities. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905,
917 (D.D.C. 1961), reVd, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962. The ordinary concept
of interrogation is the questioning of a person reluctant to make full disclosure.
See O'HARA, op. cit. supra note 10, at 95.
' 2 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 640 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring);
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340-43 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
13 The Supreme Court has shown no inclination to adopt a rule as strict as that
of India which excludes all confessions made to a police officer, see Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 588 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); nor as that of
Scotland which prohibits all interrogations of arrested persons, see United States
v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 915 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4,
1962; nor even necessarily as'that of England which requires that a person before
speaking with police be advised of his right not to speak until he has secured counsel,
see Slovenko, Rcpresentation for Indigent Defendants, 33 TUL. L. Rxv. 363, 371
(1959).
14 See Tinkle v. United States, 254 F.2d 23, 29 (8th Cir. 1958); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (dicturm).
15 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
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consultation with counsel,' 6 and police may not use mechanical devices
or agents to overhear these conferences. 17 In addition, police cannot spy
on counsel's conversations with prospective witnesses concerning their
testimony at trial,' 8 nor can federal officers place a spy in the office of a
defendant's lawyer to pose as an ally and gain information about the conduct of the defense.' 9 These protections surrounding the right to counsel cannot be divorced
from the reasons for their existence. Normally courts explain the right to
counsel on the ground that the layman is unfamiliar with legal procedures
and needs professional assistance to present his defense adequately 20 The
right to counsel, therefore, is part of a larger right of an accused to present
his defense. Since preparation for trial requires examination of facts as
well as law, 2 a defendant can aid his own cause by investigating the facts
concerning his alleged crime. A strong argument can be made that some
limitation should be placed on police methods, such as spying and use of
mechanical devices, when they may interfere with a defendant's ability to
prepare effectively for trial, even though they do not constitute an illegal
search and seizure.2 2 If the state cannot eavesdrop on a lawyer's inquiries
of witnesses concerning their testimony at trial, nor send out spies to
extract information from him, 2 similar protection should extend to the
accused himself for whose interest the lawyer is safeguarded. Uncontrolled
police spying on conversations of an accused with witnesses or alleged
accomplices can eliminate one avenue of trial preparation, since an accused
can do little to protect himself against spying except to leave his defense
24
entirely in the hands of his attorney.
One way to protect the right of a defendant to prepare his own defense
is to establish a broad rule that evidence gained through the use of
mechanical devices or spies after either preliminary hearing or indictment
will be excluded at trial. Such a rule would be relatively easy to enforce,
16 See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952); United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1950).
17 See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Coplon v. United States, supra note 16, at 759-60.
18 See United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 534 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 876 (1955).
19 See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
20 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
21 Cf. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945) ; Tinkle v. United States, 254 F.2d
23, 29 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122, 126 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 915 (1957).
22 Use of mechanical devices and spies does not constitute an illegal search and
seizure, see On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; United States v. Kabot,
295 F.2d 848, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962), unless a
trespass occurs, see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
23 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
24 Usually his lawyer will be handling more than one case at the same time, and
thus may not be able to devote full time to an investigation of the facts of the case.
Cf. United States v. Kelley, 186 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954
(1951).
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would reduce the risk of police overhearing the accused's discussion of the
alleged crime with those who might help him, and thus would enable him
to be open in his discussions in order to gain the confidence of those to
whom he speaks. But, since curtailment of police investigation during the
entire pretrial period may disserve the public interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law, perhaps the limited period between indictment
and trial could be singled out as a more appropriate period for the protection of all of the accused's conversations.2 5 After indictment a defendant has notice of the precise charge against him, and has the right to "determine his plea at arraignment. 26 At this point the process of the state has
progressed far enough so that added protection of the accused as a defendant is justified.2 7 Such a broad rule, however, would have several
disadvantages. Police might desire to use mechanical devices to gain
information about other crimes in which the accused is implicated. This
is especially true in a case like the present in which the accused may be
part of an organized conspiracy that the police are continuing to investigate.28 To exclude evidence gained through any spying on the accused
during part or all of the pretrial period might unduly shelter his other illegal
activities. A balance might be achieved by protecting only conversations
with known witnesses or alleged accomplices.
Although not fully protecting the accused, a more narrow rule might
more evenly balance the conflicting interests of the defendant and the
state. Officers could continue to use mechanical devices throughout the
pretrial period, but no information gained thereby would be admissible if
the defendant was in fact attempting to prepare his defense. This rule
could take effect immediately after preliminary hearing, and would permit
the defendant to commence his own preparation while the memories of
witnesses are fresh. Police would not be hampered in efforts to discover
information about additional crimes and accomplices, since only those conversations in which the defendant was seeking information for his defense
25
Although the ease of application is a strong factor in favor of such a rule,
there are several difficulties with it. Police activity might be unduly hampered
during a long period, since there is no set time between indictment and arraignment
and trial. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 712 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.)
(indictment Sept. 18, arraignment Sept. 21); Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d
585, 591 (8th Cir. 1958) (indictment Feb. 14, arraignment March 18, trial March 20) ;
United States v. Kelley, 186 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954
(1951) (indictment March 20, arraignment March 24, trial June 20). See also
United States v. Koplin, 227 F.2d 80, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1955) (three years between
indictment and trial). In addition, there is no direct correlation between the time
between indictment and arraignment and trial, and the time necessary to prepare a
defense. No inflexible rule can determine how much time is sufficient for any
particular investigation, see United States v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); United States ex rel. Thompson v.
Nierstheimer, 166 F.2d 87, 88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 850 (1948). Moreover, police might be tempted to postpone arrests of suspected individuals for fear
that their investigation of connected crimes would be halted.
26 Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.

42, 45-46
(1945).
2

7 Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
instant case at 67.

28 See
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would be excluded. However, the mere possibility that police might be
able to use as evidence conversations overheard though mechanical devices
would tend to discourage and restrict the defendant's preparation. In
addition, he may have to frame every statement so that if overheard it will
appear to have been made in preparation of his defense. Moreover, a judge
might be reluctant to find a conversation preparatory when it contained
damaging admissions, or might draw distinctions within the same conversation between remarks that sought information and those that did not.
Thus, even in this area of self-help, the defendant might require the aid
of counsel to determine the type of questions that could be asked. Perhaps,
then, there is need of a more pervasive limitation on police investigations
that substantially interfere with the right to prepare for trial.

CRIMINAL

LAW---MISTAKE
THID DEGREE ASSAULT

OF FACT

HELD

No

DEFENSE

TO

A passerby observed two men struggling with a boy on Jhe street and
intervened, injuring one of the men. The men were plainclothes policemen
making a lawful arrest. The intervener was arrested and convicted of third
degree assault.' The New York Appellate Division reversed the conviction
but was itself reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held, two judges
dissenting, that mistake of fact is not a defense to a charge of third degree
assault. People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1962) (per curiam).
Although "it is universally agreed that reasonable mistake exculpates
in self-defense," 2 in most jurisdictions an intervener may use only such
force in aid of one apparently assaulted as the person aided could legally
use in his own behalf.3 Consequently, a mistake of fact as to the lawfulness
1 N.Y. PEx. LAW § 244: "A person who: 1. Commits an assault, or an assault
and battery, not such as is specified in sections . .. [240 and 242], or . . . [2. drives
in a culpably negligent manner and injures someone, or 3. strikes a press photographer]. . . . Is guilty of assault in the third degree." Section 240 defines assault
in the first degree: "A person who, with an intent to kill a human being, or to commit
a felony upon the person or property of the one assaulted, or of another: 1. Assaults
another with a . . . [deadly weapon] . . . Is guilty of assault in the first degree."
Section 242 defines assault in the second degree:
A person who, under circumstances not amounting to the crime specified
in . . . [§240],

3. Wilfully and wrongfully wounds . . . another, either with or without
a weapon; or
4. Wilfully and wrongfully assaults another by the use of a weapon, or
other instrument or thing likely to produce grievous bodily harm; or,
5. Assaults another with intent to commit a felony, or to prevent or resist
the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court or officer, or the
lawful apprehension or detention of himself, or of any other person,
Is guilty of assault in the second degree.
2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
3
E.g., Robinson v. City of Decatur, 32 Ala. App. 654, 29 So. 2d 429 (1947);
Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 132 A.2d 466 (1957) ; McBroom v. State, 26 Okla.
Crim. 352, 224 Pac. 210 (1924).

RECENT CASES
of an apparent attack is no defense if the person defended knew that the
attack was a legal arrest. There is, however, some authority to the contrary. 4 Prior to the instant case, the New York courts had never faced
this issue, but statutes in that state make mistake of fact a defense if an
intervener kills in the reasonable belief that it is necessary to protect a
third party from serious injury,5 and also authorize the use of force to
protect a third party from an assault which is in fact unlawful.8
The Court of Appeals in the present case summarily adopted the
majority rule as being more "conducive to an orderly society." 7 Presumably, this court, like the dissenters in the Appellate Division,8 accepted the
state's argument 9 that the protection of plainclothes policemen is more
important than encouraging well-intentioned interventions on behalf of
unlawfully assaulted persons. The court therefore constructed a rule
designed to deter most, if not all, interventions, 10 holding, in effect, that a
wrongful intent is not necessary for a conviction of third degree assault.
The court distinguished the New York rule exculpating interveners
who kill in the reasonable belief of necessity on the ground that a murder
charge requires proof of specific intent. This distinction merely emphasizes
the fact that one must intend to act unlawfully in order to be guilty of
murder," but there is indeed more motivation to accept mistake of fact
in homicide cases since the consequences of conviction are so drastic.
4

See State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A2d 506 (App. Div. 1961),

petition for certification denied, 36 N.J. 301, 177 A.2d 343 (1962); MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 3.05, 3.09 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958) and comments appended thereto. Sae
generally 2 BURDICK, CRIME § 437, at 136-37 (1946) (mistake a defense in homicide
cases) ; CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES §§ 56, 211, 290 (5th ed. 1952) ; Hall, Ignorance
and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IN. L.J. 1, 7 (1957) (mistake should not have to
be reasonable); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
35, 54-58 (1939); Woodruff, Mistake of Fact as a Defense, 63 DIcK. L. REv. 319

(1958).
5 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1055:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed: 1. In the lawful defense of
the slayer . . . or of any other person in his presence or company, when
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person
slain to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury . . . to any
such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished

6 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 246(3) : Use of force is lawful "When committed either by
the party about to be injured or by another person in his aid or defense, in preventing
or attempting to prevent an offense against his person . .. .
7 Instant case at 275, 183 N.E.2d at 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
8 People v. Young, 12 App. Div. 2d 262, 271, 210 N.Y.S.2d 358, 367 (1961).
9 Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-11.
10 An exception would be the situation in which the intervener was certain that
the attack was illegal.
11 The ultimate question in any prosecution is whether or not all of the
essential elements of guilt are established. If any such element is found to be
wanting, guilt has not been substantiated; and hence if proof of a mistake
of fact . . . negatives the existence of such an element, it also disproves
the charge itself.
Perkins, supra note 4, at 56.
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Nor is the present decision inconsistent with the well-settled rule 12
that a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense when the actor was defending
himself from an apparent attack. It is difficult not to act on appearances
in cases of self-defense; a person's interest in protecting someone else is
much less compelling. In addition, a self-defender is less likely to be mistaken than a "Good Samaritan," who is probably less able to ascertain
when a party to an affray is justified in his actions. Consequently, it might
be said that interveners are entitled to less protection from the law than
persons acting in self-defense and may justifiably be required to act at
3
their peril.'
Nevertheless, the sanctions of the criminal law traditionally have
been directed toward persons who either knowingly commit unlawful acts
or act with reckless disregard of the rights of others.' 4 This policy accords
with the commonly accepted ends of the criminal law: the punishment,
incapacitation, and reformation of actual offenders, and the deterrence of
potential offenders.' 5 One who has acted reasonably and with good intentions need not and ought not to be punished, incapacitated, or reformed.
He is no more dangerous than any other reasonable man and" in this respect
is unlike an actor who is so dull-witted that what appears proper to him
is actually reckless or unlawful.' 6 His punishment can only be justified
on the ground of deterrence. Even though the defendant in the present
case is not deserving of criminal punishment, his conviction theoretically

discourages other potential Good Samaritans, who unrealistically are presumed to know the law, from committing reasonable but socially dangerous
acts. The drafters of the Model Penal Code have rightly condemned this

position as "indefensible," declaring that liability without culpability "has
no place in penal law." "The law is made to govern men in their conduct
and they must act on their appraisal of a situation, if they are to act at
all." 17 Conviction for assault and battery, absent culpability, cannot be
12

See MODEL

'3

Ibid.

PENAL CODE

§ 3.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).

14 "[H]e who injured another . . . through unavoidable mistake might be liable
for the damages which he caused, but since he lacked a blameworthy mind he was
not punishable for a crime. Blameworthiness thus came to be and still remains the
foundation of the conception of criminality." Sayre, The Present Significance of
Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 401-02 (1934).
When the framers of the Model Penal Code adopted the rule that all mistakes of
fact are defenses if the defendant was not reckless, they based their decision on the
lack of culpability. 'MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958),
At common law, public nuisances seem to be the only exception to the rule that
criminal guilt requires mens rea. Perkins, supra note 4, at 58-59. These offenses
were included in the "crime" category for convenience, in order that they might be
handled procedurally by the machinery used for criminal cases. Ibid.
15 See MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 6-11
(1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE, §§ 1-9 (Anderson ed. 1957).
16 Mental or emotional deficiencies short of insanity, a finding of which permits
confinement in a mental hospital, are not a defense in a criminal prosecution. E.g.,
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946); People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163
N.E. 553 (1928).
17 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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justified by reference to the common practice of convicting persons of the
minor statutory offenses known as "public welfare offenses" without a
showing of wrongful intent or recklessness.' 8 In the public welfare offense
cases the penalty is usually slight, the stigma resulting from conviction
small, and the need for large scale enforcement great; 19 moreover, it is
likely that in many instances the defendant knew or should have known
that he was acting unlawfully. To require a showing of wrongful intent or
recklessness probably would not result in many acquittals but might well
erect an administrative impediment to the enforcement of necessary
regulations.
To some extent the court in the present case could have achieved its
goal of deterrence by reversing the conviction and granting the injured
party relief in a civil assault action in which mistake of fact would not be a
defense.20 It is likely, however, that some interveners will be judgmentproof. In addition, exclusive reliance on a civil remedy will result in a
lesser degree of deterrence. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that these factors
justify the imposition of criminal liability without fault.

DISOOVERY-OPIwioN OF ADVERSE PARTY'S PROSPECTIVE APPRAISER-WTNESS DISCOVERABiE AS OF RIGHT

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, the state
served interrogatories on the landowner-defendants in a condemnation case.
The interrogatories requested the opinion of the defendants' appraiser who
was to testify at trial. The trial court sustained the defendants' objection
that the interrogatories sought the work product of their attorney. On
appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the information requested
In general, offenses not requiring tnens rea are the minor violations of
laws regulating the sale of intoxicating liquor, impure or adulterated food,
milk, drugs or narcotics, criminal nuisances, violations of traffic or motorvehicle regulations, or of general police regulations passed for the safety,
health, or well-being of the community and not in general involving moral
delinquency.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 83 (1933).
19There are, however, some relatively serious offenses which are sometimes
included in this category. For example, in New York a defendant can be sentenced
to a maximum of one year in jail for the sale or possession of obscene material without
a showing of criminal intent. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1141, People v. Shapiro, 6 App.
Div. 2d 271, 177 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1958). One can also be found guilty of narcotic
crimes, bigamy, or statutory rape without any proof of wrongful intent. It is difficult
to justify the omission of wrongful intent as an element of such serious crimes.
New York has not yet
20 Cf. State v. McDonald, 7 Mo. App. 510 (1879).
decided whether mistake of fact is a defense in a civil action for assault. The law
in other jurisdictions is somewhat confused. See PROSSER, TORTS § 17 (2d ed. 1955) ;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 76 (1934). Compare Roberson v. Stokes, 181 N.C. 59, 106
S.E. 151 (1921), with Smith v. Delery, 238 La. 180, 114 So. 2d 857 (1959), and
Patterson v. Kuntz, 28 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 1946).
18
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was not work product and was discoverable as of right.' However, it found
that the error below was not prejudicial and affirmed the verdict. State
ex rel. Villey v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120, 370 P.2d 273 (1962).
Under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, which are substantially
the same as the Federal Rules,2 the contents of a document, if not privileged,
can generally be elicited as of right by means of depositions under Rule
26 or interrogatories under Rule 33.3 It is generally accepted that experts'
opinions are not privileged ; 4 nevertheless, absent a showing of good cause,
courts often deny discovery of expert opinions and have never permitted
discovery of opinions contained in appraisers' reports.5 No court has
articulated a sound policy basis for so holding; most of the condemnation
cases simply have relied on precedents which in turn rely on cases dealing
with experts in non-condemnation proceedings. 6
Some courts have attempted to justify nondisclosure of expert opinion
on the basis of the work-product doctrine 7 originated in Hickman v.
Taylor,8 in which the Supreme Court held that statements obtained by a
1 The court did, however, sustain the trial court's refusal to allbw discovery of
the names and addresses of all appraisers employed by the defendants. Instant case
at 125-26, 370 P.2d at 277. This safeguarded the adversary nature of condemnation
cases by insuring that a party may procure a number of appraisals while only submitting the most favorable at trial without fear that the others would be disclosed
and used against him.
2 The particular Arizona Rules referred to in this comment are identical in number and substance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3 Rule 34 permits a party to obtain the document itself, but only upon a showing
of good cause.
4

See, e.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948)

(per curiam); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739, 742-43
(E.D. La. 1962); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 229

(S.D. Cal. 1953); 4

'MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

126.24, at 1152-56 (2d ed. 1950).

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), which refused to characterize statements obtained by an attorney from prospective witnesses as within the attorney-client
privilege, renders it difficult to sustain the argument that expert opinion falls within
that privilege. 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra 1 26.24, at 1155.
5
E.g., United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955),
United States v. 7534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954). Courts
have sometimes allowed discovery of the opinions of experts other than appraisers.
E.g., Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
However, this difference apparently does not result from any distinction made between
appraisers and other experts. Facts gathered by an appraiser, as distinguished from
his opinion, can often be discovered as of right under Rules 26 or 33. E.g., United
States v. 284392 Sq. Ft. of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953). This is also
true of facts gathered by non-appraiser experts. E.g., Maginnis v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., supra note 4; Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J.
1954).
6 See, e.g., United States v. 284392 Sq. Ft. of Floor Space, supra note 5; United
States v. Certain Acres of Land, supra note 5; United States v. 7534.04 Acres of
Land, supra note 5. The authority for many condemnation cases denying discovery
of appraisers' opinions is a dictum in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp.,
32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940). Instant case at 122-23, 370 P.2d at 275. Lewis
was decided before condemnation proceedings were made subject to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 71A was not promulgated until 1951.
7 See, e.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D.
257 (D. Neb. 1959); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
8329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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lawyer from a prospective witness were discoverable only upon a "showing
of necessity." 9 In extending this doctrine, at least one court has fictionalized the expert into an "assistant counsel," "o but a recent district court
decision placed work product in its proper perspective, defining it as the
product of "a lawyer, doing a lawyer's work in preparing a case for trial." 11
If expert opinion is to be protected from discovery as of right, such protection should not be justified by the obvious fiction that an expert is a
lawyer.1 2 A more substantial rationale has been advanced-that unlimited
discovery would give one party a "free ride," allowing him to use, without
expense, the work of the other party.13 This argument is not applicable to
the instant case, for the state offered to pay for the information requested, 14
and, in any case a "free ride" can be avoided by conditioning discovery on
the partial payment of expenses. 15 A more refined argument is that if
expert opinion were discoverable as of right, an attorney might wait until
his opponent had conducted an extensive investigation, discover what fruits
of that investigation would be used against him at trial, and then employ
an expert to refute only those points. If the area of expert inquiry were
large, this might result in a considerable financial saving for the client,
even if discovery were contingent on sharing.costs. Should both attorneys
be encouraged by discovery rules to play the waiting game, last minute
and perhaps inadequate preparation might become the practice, resulting
in a reduced standard of litigation.
However valid in other contexts, this argument is not persuasive when
applied to condemnation cases. Since a party has little hope of convincing a
jury that his opponent's expert valuation is wrong without introducing his
own affirmative testimony concerning true value, both parties will invariably
9

The "showing of necessity" required to justify discovery of work product is

stronger than the good cause normally required under Rule 34. See 2A BARRON &
HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 652.4 (Wright ed. 1961) ; 4 MOORE,
FEDE.A PRACTICE 34.08, at 2454 (2d ed. 1950).

10 See Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684, 687
(D. Mass. 1947).
11 E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416,
419 (D. Del. 1959).
12The Supreme Court justified the work-product doctrine on the ground that
"it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a

client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11

(1947).

This rationale is obviously not applicable to the discovery of the substance

of a completed report by an expert who is to testify at trial. One of the few courts
of appeals cases in this area recognized that a metallographer "is not an attorney
but is an expert" and refused to apply the work-product doctrine to his opinion.
Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) (per curiam).
13 See, e.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D.
Pa. 1940) ; 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24, at 1157-59 (2d ed. 1950).
14 Brief for Appellant, p. 6, instant case.
15 See United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
See also Leding v. U.S. Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959); 4 MooRE,
op. cit. supra note 13 1 26.24, at 1157-58.
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make their own complete appraisals. Moreover, unlike other controversies
requiring expert testimony, the area of expert inquiry in condemnation
cases is confined to the value of the land; appraisers will differ only as to
the factors considered relevant and the weight accorded each. There is
consequently no potential financial advantage to induce an attorney to play
the waiting game.
In short, neither the language of the Rules nor considerations of
policy justify the immunization of appraisers' opinions from discovery as
of right; indeed, there are strong reasons for allowing such discovery.
The trial of a condemnation case is long and arduous when each attorney
tries to embarrass the other party's appraiser and convince the jury that the
opposing appraisal is unsound. Numerous detailed questions may be asked
concerning the factors considered by each appraiser in evaluating the condemned property.16 Often the trials succeed only in confusing the jury,
and verdicts unrelated to a sound rationalization of the most cogent evidence presented are not uncommon.17 Pretrial discovery of the opinions
of prospective appraiser-witnesses could do much to ameliorate this situas
A
tion by facilitating shorter and more effective cross-examination.'
litigant could probe before trial the factors considered by an appraiser in
making his evaluation and would be spared the necessity of the wide-range
cross-examination now characteristic of condemnation cases. In particular,
each appraiser's opinion of what is the highest and best use of the land
could be discovered and each litigant could prepare fully to meet this issue,
19
limiting his attack to the weakest elements of his opponent's appraisal.
In holding that a party must answer interrogatories inquiring into
the opinion of his appraiser who will testify at trial, the court in the present
case couched its opinion in terms of experts generally, indicating that the
opinions of all prospective expert witnesses will hereafter be discoverable
as of right under the Arizona Rules. In future situations the court should
not ignore the possibility that a different result might be appropriate when
experts other than appraisers are involved.
16 See Yates, Testimony of the Expert Appraiser in Condcmnation Proceedings,
32 NVAsH. L. REv. 314, 317 (1957).
17 Ibid. See generally Paul, Condemnation Procedure Under Rile 71A, 43 IovA

L. Rav. 231, 236 (1958), in which it is suggested that trial of valuation issues before a jury is cumbersome and ineffective and that a special jury of selected persons
would save time and yield more accurate results.
18 See United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420, 422 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 233 (S.D. Cal.
1953); Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information,
14 STA,. L. Rav. 455, 485-86 (1962) ; Comment, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 860, 863. It has
been suggested that the threat of discovery of the contents of experts' reports would
lead to the preparation of more honest and reliable reports. Friedenthal, supra at
485-86; Comment, supra at 863. Rather than stimulating objectivity, discovery might
only cause experts to take greater care in the preparation of exaggerated claims.
19 See Frost, The Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89 (1960).
See generally Hawkins, What's Wrong About Surprise?, 39 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1953),
which develops the thesis that effective cross-examination is destroyed by extensive
discovery.
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LIBEL AND SLANDER--DFENSE

ATTORNEY'S REPLY IN THE

PRESS TO PROSECUTOR'S PRESS RELEASE PREJUDICIAL TO CLIENT
HELD- NOT PRIVILEGED

Defendant-attorney represented a Negro charged with the rape of
plaintiff, a white married woman. After learning that the prosecutor had
released to a local newspaper the Negro's confession of intercourse with
plaintiff, defendant told the paper his client's story-that plaintiff had
consented. After the story was published plaintiff sued defendant for
slander. At the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for
defendant, holding that he had a qualified privilege to publish the statement.1
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that he
had neither an absolute nor a qualified privilege to publish the slanderous
statement. Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962).
In order to allow counsel complete freedom to examine witnesses and
explore all arguments and defenses without fear of defamation actions,
courts have afforded attorneys an absolute privilege to make defamatory
2
statements in judicial proceedings even if made knowingly and maliciously.
Although this privilege is not strictly confined to statements made within
the courtroom, it does not extend to statements made directly to the press.3
In addition, whenever the public interest in unimpeded communications"
outweighs the policy of protection of reputation,4 courts have recognized a
qualified privilege to communicate information in which the parties making
and receiving the statements have legitimate interests. 5
The court in the present case recognized the attorney's duty: to protect
his client's interests 6 and apparently realized that the prosecutor's press
release was highly prejudicial to those interests; 7 nevertheless, it held that
I See Brief for Appellant, app., pp. 45-46 (trial court opinion).
2 Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 14 Atl. 505 (1888); Matthis v. Kennedy,
243 Minn. 219, 224, 67 N.W2d 413, 417 (1954). See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 522,
at 427 (1956); PRossER, TORTS § 95, at 608 (2d ed. 1955). See generally Veeder,
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceediigs, 9 COLUm. L. REv. 463
(1909).
3
See Washer v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 21 Cal. 2d 822,
136 P.2d 297 (1943) ; Jacobs v. Herlands, 17 N.Y.S.2 711 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
259 App. Div. 823, 19 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1940).
4 See Hoover v. Jordan, 27 Colo. App. 515, 517, 150 Pac. 333, 334 (1915);
Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557-58, 117 A.2d 889,
891 (1955); Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super. 112, 124, 167 A2d 211, 217 (App.
Div. 1961).
5 See, e.g., Deckelman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 131 AtI. 762 (1926); Bostetter v.
Kirsch Co., 319 Mich. 547, 558, 30 N.W.2d 276, 280 (1948). See generally Developinents in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. Rzv. 875 (1956). Thus a person may
be privileged to publish defamation to protect his own interests, see, e.g., Ling v.
Whittemore, 140 Colo. 247, 343 P2d 1048 (1959); Cartwright v. Herald Publishing
Co., 220 S.C. 492, 68 S.E.2d 415 (1951), or the interests of the persons to whom he
communicates, see, e.g., Exude v. Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 161, 143
P.2d 20, 28 (1943); Fowler v. New York Herald Co., 184 App. Div. 608, 172 N.Y.
Supp. 423 (1918).
Instant case, 182 A2d at 59. See also ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSioNAL Evics,
Canon 5.
7 The trial court also recognized this problem of prejudice. See Brief for Appellant, app., p. 46. See generally Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime
and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1961).
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defendant's communication was not qualifiedly privileged because it was
not made to proper parties.8 The court reasoned that newspaper publica9
tion of defamatory matter in order to counteract possible jury prejudice
cannot be privileged because even if the unknown jurors are considered
interested parties within the scope of the doctrine of common interest, such
widespread publication clearly would be excessive.
Although the court properly applied the common interest doctrine, it
failed to consider the question of the Negro's right to reply to the
prosecutor's allegations in order to repair the damage done his reputation
by the press release containing only one side of the story. When such
information appears without any statement of defense, an accused may be
branded as a criminal in the minds of many readers; even subsequent
acquittal may not repair the damage since news of acquittal may not reach
many of the original readers. In similar cases in which persons have been
assailed in the press, courts have granted a qualified privilege to reply to
the attack ' 0-not only to deny the charges, but also to question the motives
of the assailant." In the present case the defendant was merely trying to
correct the misleading impression produced by the publication of only the

prosecutor's version of the crime; certainly the accused should be privileged
in protecting his reputation by stating his defense.
8 Instant case, 182 A.2d at 59.

9 The court suggested that the attorney had other means to effect this end. Instant
case, 182 A.2d at 59. The court said that he could have tried to stop publication of
the story, but the newspaper would have had no reason to agree. Another suggested
means of preventing jury prejudice-voir dire examination-is manifestly ineffective
and tactically dangerous because even if the juror has read the story and formed an
opinion of defendant's guilt or innocence, he need not be discharged for cause if he
states that he can disregard the story in reaching his verdict, see People v. Duncan,
53 Cal. 2d 803, 816, 350 P.2d 103, 110 (1960), petition for cert. dismissed sub nom.
Baldonado v. California, 366 U.S. 417 (1961); Donnelly & Goldfarb, Contempt by
Publication in the United States, 24 'ODERN L. Rav. 239, 246 (1961), and to ask
about the story may recall it to a juror who has forgotten it. See Note, Fair Trial v.
Freedom of the Press in Criminal Cases, 35 TEmp. L.Q. 412, 431 (1962). Though
the Maryland Constitution provides an absolute right to a change of venue in capital
cases, MD. CoxsT. art. 4, § 8; MD. Axx. CODE art. 75, § 44 (1957), this alternative
is also inadequate since publication of such an inflammatory crime may well have
reached every part of the state. See Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence
on Trials, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 840, 844-45 (1950). Another alternative is waiver of
jury trial. In 'Maryland, a defendant may waive jury trial even in capital cases.
See Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 100 A.2d 257 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938
(1954). However, a defendant may need the prosecution's and the court's consent
to waive. See Donnelly, The Defendant's Right To Waive Jury Trial in Criminal
Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. Rav. 247, 251-59 (1956) ; Note, Government Consent to Waiver
of Jury Trial Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Crininal Procedure, 65
YALE L.J. 1032 (1956).
10 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Baer, 96 Md. 152, 53 Atl. 790 (1902); Cartwright v.
Herald Publishing Co., 220 S.C. 492, 498-99, 68 S.E.Zd 415, 417 (1951). See generally
Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 13 MINN. L. REv. 21, 31-34
(1928). This has long been law in England. See GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER
255-59 (5th ed. 1960). Continental law is also in accord with this view. See Leflar,
Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423, 441-44 (1952); Rothenberg,
The Right of Reply to Libels in the Press, 23 J. Colt i. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 38
(1941). See also Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to at Action for
Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948).
t11
Mencher v. Chesley, 193 Misc. 829, 85 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Collier
v. Postum Cereal Co., 150 App. Div. 169, 178, 134 N.Y. Supp. 847, 853 (1912). See
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The present case may be distinguished from the usual right-to-reply
case 1 2 because the prosecutor, not the plaintiff, initiated the publication of
information concerning the crime.13 Nevertheless, as complaining witness,
the plaintiff can be said to have been indirectly responsible for the publication ' 4 since she should have expected that her accusation of rape to the
prosecutor would not escape the attention of the press. A charge of
criminality, especially of a violent sex crime, can result in a substantial
impairment of the accused's reputation. Of course plaintiff has a right,
perhaps a duty, and certainly a privilege to file the charges, but the fact that
the initial charges were privileged does not preclude a privilege to reply
to them.

5

Since it is difficult, if not impossible, for an incarcerated accused to
reply in the press, it is essential, if defendant's right to reply is to have
substance, that his attorney be allowed to exercise the privilege for him.
In other situations courts have effectuated the right to reply by allowing a
widow to reply to an attack against her deceased husband and by granting
the newspaper in which the privileged reply appears a qualified privilege to
print it.'8 Furthermore, it would be undesirable to require defendants to
communicate directly to the press because of the danger that uniadvised
defendants may further incriminate themselves. Thus the court in the
present case should have allowed the attorney, as his client's agent and
counsel, a qualified privilege to reply to the prosecutor's press release by
stating his client's defense.
Denial of the privilege in a case like the present does little to protect
plaintiff's reputation. Unless the admission of intercourse is suppressed,
the defense of consent almost certainly will be raised at trial when counsel
will be absolutely privileged to publish it '7 and newspapers will be privileged to print it as part of the court record.' 8 The preservation of the
right to a fair trial by encouraging impartial reporting of both defendant's
and prosecutor's version of the crime is another ground for according
defendant a privilege to reply. Consequently, the present decision, although
properly rejecting the contention of privilege on two other grounds, failed to
take account of significant policy considerations that suggest the propriety
of affording an accused's attorney a privileged right to reply to charges in
the press.
12 See,

e.g., Preston v. Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363, 146 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1914);

Chaffin v. Lynch, 83 Va. 106, 1 S.E. 803 (1887).
13 See Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6.
14 See, e.g., McDonald v. Lieber, 184 La. 812, 167 So. 450 (1936) ; Conroy v.
Fall River
Herald News Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 488, 28 N.E.2d 729 (1940).
15 Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., 131 S.C. 485, 127 S.E. 606 (1925) (initial
publication made in legislative hall).
16 Israel v. Portland News Publishing Co., 152 Ore. 225, 53 P.2d 529 (1936).
See, e.g., Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Co., 220 S.C. 492, 68 S.E.2d 415 (1951) ;
GREGORY & KAL EN, op. cit. mipra note 11, at 1013; 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 5.17,

at 401 (1956).
17 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
18 1 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. ,ipra note 16 § 5.24, at 431. See Note, Qualified
Privilege as a Defense to Defamatioi, 45 U. VA. L. REv. 772, 776 (1959).

